Medicare's Part B program (Supplementary Medical Insurance) provides basic health insurance coverage to ease the financial burden of health care services for the aged population of the nation, for disabled Social Security beneficiaries, and for persons with end stage renal disease. Although the program was not intended to cover all the costs of medical care, several factors can diminish the protection beneficiaries have against the burden of large medical bills. These factors include the level of physicians' acceptance of assignment and the program's cost-sharing mechanisms.
This paper provides a detailed description of physicians' assignment rates for services rendered in 1975; assignment rates are analyzed by demographic characteristics of the beneficiaries, (that is, persons enrolled in Part B) by geographic area, and by physician specialty. This paper also analyzes total beneficiary outlays (for the premium, the deductible, coinsurance, and liability from unassigned claims) to determine the total burden on beneficiaries and compares that total with program reimbursements.
Assignment
Physicians' assignment decisions determine to a significant extent the degree to which beneficiaries are protected by Medicare's Part B insurance. Under the Medicare program, the physician decides whether to accept assignment on each Medicare claim. If the claim is assigned, the physician agrees to accept as full payment the amount Medicare determines as reasonable. 1 If the physician does not accept assignment, the Medicare patient is liable for the difference between the amount charged and the amount Medicare allows; if this difference is large, beneficiary liability can be substantial. In such 1 The "reasonable" or "allowed" charge is the lowest of (1) the actual charge made by the physician for that service, (2) the physician's customary charge (the physician's 50th percentile) for that service or (3) the prevailing charge (set at the 75th percentile of weighted customaries) in that locality for that service.
instances, the program is less successful in protecting beneficiaries from the cost of health care. 2 Beginning with 1968, national data are available on the rate of acceptance of assignment based on the total number of claims. In that year, the net assignment rate 3 was 59.0 percent. In 1969, the proportion rose to 61.5 percent, the highest it has ever registered since data have been available. Thereafter, there was a general decline each year in the percent of assigned claims. Comparable data are also available beginning with 1971 on the percent of total charges that were assigned. As may be seen in the following data, the percentage of total charges assigned was lower each year than the percentage of claims assigned. The percent of charges assigned reached a low point in 1976 (47.6 percent), then rose in 1977 and again in 1978 . Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Net It should be noted that the data above-as well as the data generated for this study-include claims for Medicare beneficiaries who are also enrolled in Medicaid. For Medicaid beneficiaries, assignment is mandatory. Consequently, if the assignment rate were computed for voluntary assignment only, the rate would be lower.
Sources of Data
The detailed information that follows is derived from a new and continuing data set based on claims for physicians' services in 1975. The data are furnished centrally to HCFA from claims submitted on Medicare "1490" forms and processed by Medicare carriers for a 5 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries throughout the nation. To facilitate data processing for this study, a subset was used consisting of a 1 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries. This new data system was designed to provide a greater depth of information about the use of physicians' services than previously available from the ongoing payment record system. Data items available, beginning with 1975 services, include the Medicare identification number of the patient, the physician's total charge, the amount Medicare allowed, the Medicare reimbursement, whether or not the claim was assigned, the speciality of the physician, type of service (that is, medical care, surgery, laboratory service, etc.), and site of service (office, hospital, etc.) . Data from the master health insurance enrollment file-which contains the age, sex, race, and residence of the beneficiary-are incorporated into the claims file data to provide information about the characteristics of the users. 2 For example, suppose a beneficiary has met the $60 deductible and is charged $80 for a physician service. If the reasonable charge is determined to be $60 and the physician accepts assignment, the program reimbuses the physician 80 percent or $48. The beneficiary owes the 20 percent coinsurance or $12. If the physician does not accept assignment, the beneficiary owes the $12 coinsurance plus $20, the amount above the reasonable charge. 3 The net assignment rate is the number of assigned claims expressed as a percentage of claims received, omitting claims from hospital-based physicians and group-practice prepayment plans which are considered assigned by definition. Data are from the Bureau of Program Operations, HCFA.
Findings
Variations in Assignment by Age, Sex, and Race Table 1 shows the percent of services assigned and the percent of charges assigned based on the new data set.
The Aged
Among the aged, 45.8 percent of all physicians' services and 47.2 percent of all physicians' charges were assigned. Physicians' acceptance of assignment for services of males versus females showed little difference (45.5 percent and 45.9 percent of services respectively). It is notable that acceptance of assignment was greater with successively older age groups of beneficiaries-42.0 percent of services in the group 65-69 years of age compared to 56.8 percent for persons aged 85 and over. These findings may reflect several factors, including increased willingness on the part of physicians to accept assignment for steady, long-time patients, or for patients who are likely to have diminished income and assets. Also, as age increases there is increased participation in Medicaid-for which there is mandatory assignment.
Services for non-white beneficiaries were assigned at a considerably higher rate than services for white beneficiaries. For non-white beneficiaries 78.4 percent of services were The Disabled Among the disabled, physicians accepted assignment for 59.7 percent of the services provided-a proportion considerably higher than that for the aged. Unlike the aged, assignment of services for the disabled was lower for successively older age groups-77.1 percent for persons under 25 years of age to 56.7 percent for those in the age group 45-64 years. Similar to the aged, the sex of the disabled was not a determining factor. Also similar to the findings on the aged, data on non-whites showed a much higher assignment rate than data on whites-84.5 percent versus 56.1 percent of services respectively. This difference again is very likely explained by the levels of Medicaid entitlement. Table 2 shows assignment rates by census region, division, and State.
Assignment by Geographic Area
5 Among the census regions, acceptance of assignment for services to the aged ranged from a low in the North Central region of 35.2 percent to a high of 56.8 percent in the Northeast region. Among the census divisions, the lowest percentages of services assigned were in the West North Central (32.4), Mountain (35.8) , and East North Central (36.7) divisions while the highest rate was in the New England division (66.3). Similar variations were seen for the disabled population except that the rates for the disabled were consistently higher than those for the aged in all areas, possibly reflecting physicians' perceptions of less favorable economic conditions of the disabled compared with the aged.
There were wide variations in assignment rates among the States, with the figures for the aged ranging from a low of 18.0 percent of services assigned in Oregon to a high of 80.6 percent in Rhode Island. No geographic pattern in rate of assignment was apparent. In fact, adjacent States often had greatly different rates: Pennsylvania-56.9 percent and Ohio-27.3 percent; Connecticut-31.2 percent and Rhode Island-80.6 percent. 4 Medicare data for the aged for 1975 shows that 11.3 percent of total beneficiaries were included in state "buy-ins" to Medicare. By race, the percent of white persons was 9.3 percent and for non-whites, 35.3 percent. For the disabled, 18.6 percent of Part B beneficiaries were included in State "buy-ins" to Medicare. The percent for white persons was 16.5 and for non-whites, 31.6 percent. 5 Codes submitted for this data base to indicate whether claims were assigned are unreliable for California. Because California's assignment rate significantly affects the rate for the census division and region, data are also omitted for the Pacific division and the Western region. Workload reports generated by the Bureau of Program Operations, HCFA, indicate that 57.6 percent of total claims (aged and disabled combined) and 48.4 percent of total charges processed by California fiscal agents (carriers) in 1975 were assigned. 1 Codes submitted for this data base to indicate whether claims were assigned are unreliable for California. Because California's assignment rate significantly affects the rate for the census division and region, data on assignment rates are also omitted for the Pacific division and the Western region. Workload reports generated by the Bureau of Program Operations, HCFA, indicate that 57.6 percent of total claims (aged and disabled combined) and 48.4 percent of total charges processed by California fiscal agents (carriers) in 1975 were assigned.
It may be noted that in most areas the percent of charges assigned was a little higher than the percent of services assigned, indicating that the average charge for assigned services was generally a little higher than the average charge for unassigned services.
These State data also show the same pattern of higher assignment rates for the disabled compared to the aged with the figures for the disabled ranging from a low of 11.7 percent of services assigned in Montana to a high of 96.5 percent in Vermont. Table 3 shows the rate of assignment of services and charges according to the specialties of the physicians. Assignment rates varied considerably among the physician specialties. For the aged, the percentages of services assigned ranged from 32.0 percent for services by licensed chiropractors to 67.1 percent for services by pathologists. For the disabled, the percentages ranged from 39.8 percent for otology/rhinology/laryngology services to 72.0 percent for podiatrists' services. Figure 1 shows the percents of total charges assigned for the five types of physicians that serve the greatest number of beneficiaries. Of these five types of physicians, acceptance of assignment for the aged was highest for Radiologists (55.5) and lowest for Ophthalmologists (44.0). The figure also shows that for each specialty except ophthalmology, the rate of assigned charges for the disabled is approximately 15 percentage points higher than for the aged.
Assignment by Physician Specialty
Specialties varied considerably with geography. Table 4 shows the rates of assignment for the four most frequently used specialties by census region.
For the aged, the North Central region consistently had the lowest assignment rate among these four specialties. The Northeast region had the highest rate for internal medicine (55.8 percent), general surgery (60.9 percent), and radiology (72.6 percent). For the disabled, assignment rates were consistently higher in the Northeast compared to the South and North Central regions. For most specialties, the average charge per service was higher for assigned services in comparison to unassigned services. For the aged, exceptions to this rule were services by pathologists and radiologists. For the disabled, exceptions were for services by ophthalmologists and radiologists. For the aged, the ratio of average charge per service on assigned claims to average charge per service on unassigned claims reached a high of 1.44 for services by ophthalmologists, and for the disabled, the ratio reached 1.57 for services by otologists/rhinologists/laryngologists. 
Physicians' Average Charge Per Service by Specialty and by Assignment

Average Percent Reduction
Under Medicare's Customary, Prevailing, and Reasonable Charge (CPR) mechanism, physicians' charges are passed through screens to determine the "reasonable" or "allowed" charge for each service. The total charges submitted by all physicians for services in 1975 were reduced 18.4 percent as a result of the CPR mechanism. Table 6 shows average percent reduction of submitted charges to allowed charges by specialty and by assignment. For the aged, the average percent reduction ranged from a low of 13.3 percent for charges by licensed chiropractors to a high of 23.6 percent for charges by anesthesiologists; for the disabled, the range was from 13.9 percent for charges by pathologists to 23.4 percent for charges by anesthesiologists. These differences by specialty in the rate of reduction of submitted charges reflect differences in charge patterns including differences by specialty in the rate of increase of current charges compared to charges submitted the previous calendar year (the period on which the reasonable charge determinations are based).
Examination of percent reduction by specialty according to assigned and unassigned charges shows that the percent reduction was generally a little higher on assigned charges in comparison to unassigned charges. For both the aged and disabled the most notable exceptions to this rule were charges by pathologists and radiologists.
It has been suggested that the size of the bill and the percent reduction on the bill are factors in the physician's decision to accept or reject assignment. In regard to these factors, one hypothesis is that as the size of the bill increases, the rate of assignment increases, because the larger the bill the greater the risk of the patient not being able to pay for it out-ofpocket. Thus, accepting assignment assures payment. Another hypothesis is that as the amount of reduction on the bill increases, the rate of assignment decreases, because refusing assignment allows the physician to recover the total charge from the patient.
Unfortunately, these hypotheses cannot be tested with the Medicare claims payment system. Under Medicare's system, if the beneficiary accumulates several bills from the same physician and submits them together they become one "claim." Consequently, a $180 unassigned claim can actually represent bills for, say, a $50 service, a $30 service, and five $20 services rendered over a period of a year. Thus, the amount of a Medicare unassigned claim is an artifact of the way beneficiaries submit bills. Similarly, the percent reduction on an unassigned claim is an artifact of the way the beneficiary submits his or her bills, so that a 20 percent reduction on an unassigned claim can be the net effect of, say, a 30 percent reduction on a bill given to the beneficiary in February and a 15 percent reduction on a bill given to the beneficiary in July. One hypothesis that can be tested is: Do the total charges a beneficiary accumulates from physicians over the year influence whether the charges will be assigned? The results of a special computer tabulation that groups beneficiaries by total annual charges per beneficiary indicates that the percent of charges assigned increases quite steadily as the beneficiaries' total charges increase. Table 7 (for all specialties) shows that for persons with annual charges under $100, only 38.2 percent were assigned. For persons with annual charges of $2,500 or more, 60.8 percent of the charges were assigned. Thus, it appears that the amount of total charges incurred by a beneficiary during the year is a determining factor in assignment decisions. Tabulations for general practice, internal medicine, general surgery, and radiology were also run (Tables 8, 9 , 10, and 11). The results were similar except for radiology, which exhibited no clear pattern as total charges increased. 
Impact of Unassigned Claims on Aged Beneficiaries
Unassigned claims affect a high proportion of the beneficiaries. In 1975, of the total Medicare beneficiaries in the U.S. who received payments for physician services, nearly 70 percent had some liability from unassigned claims, that is, liability for the difference between the physician's charges and the Medicare-allowed charges. Table 12 shows the percentage of users with liability from unassigned claims and the percentage of users with $100 or more of liability. The data show that in the U.S., 9.7 percent of the users were liable for $100 or more from unassigned claims.
It may be observed that there is a wide variation by State in the percentage of beneficiaries affected by unassigned claims. The highest percentage of users with liability was in Oregon where 93.3 percent were affected by unassigned claims. Table 12 also shows that nearly 17 percent of the users in Oregon were liable for $100 or more from unassigned claims.
Beneficiaries' Cost-Sharing
Beneficiary participation or cost-sharing begins with the fixed monthly premium. Additional cost-sharing in outlays for the deductible and coinsurance is a variable expense and depends upon use. Similarly, liability arising from unassigned claims is a variable expense that depends upon the level of use and charges for services. Not all of these expenses are paid out-ofpocket by Medicare beneficiaries. Of the total aged beneficiaries enrolled in Part B, 11.3 percent were included under the Medicaid "buy-in" provision. In addition, more than half of Medicare beneficiaries have private health insurance which supplements Medicare coverage. These policies are quite varied and may cover some or all of the charges not reimbursed by Medicare. 
Deductible, Coinsurance, and Liability on Unassigned Claims
Monthly Premium
The remaining source of beneficiary outlay is the fixed expenditure for the monthly premium. Table 14 shows the fixed premium expenditures as well as the variable expenditures as components of total beneficiary liability. The fixed annual Part B premium shown of $66.01 is a prorated figure based on reimbursements for physicians' services as a percentage of total Part B reimbursement. 6 Overall, total beneficiary liability for physicians' services was estimated at $3.16 billion or $145.18 per beneficiary. Fixed expenditures (the premiums) represented 45.5 percent while variable expenditures made up 54.5 percent-(19.1 percent for the deductible, 21.7 percent for coinsurance, and 13.7 percent for liability on unassigned claims).
Medicare Reimbursements Compared to Beneficiary Liability
By comparing total beneficiary liability with Medicare reimbursements, the degree of insurance protection afforded the aged for physicians' services by the Medicare program can be further assessed. These total estimated expen- 6 The total annual premium was $80.40; reimbursements for physician services accounted for 82.1 percent of the Part B reimbursement. ditures of $4.57 billion or $209.81 per beneficiary are the physicians' charges less the charges above the allowed charges on assigned claims. Overall, the amount channeled through Medicare was $2.8 billion or 62.3 percent for physicians' services, while beneficiaries had liabilities (not including premiums) of $1.73 billion or 37.7 percent of total estimated expenditures for Part B physicians' services (Table 15) . Per beneficiary, figures were $130.64 paid by Medicare and $79.17 for which the beneficiary was liable. Table 16 presents a different perspective by comparing the total liabilities of the beneficiaries (including the premium contributions as well as expenses due to the deductible, coinsurance, and the liability from unassigned claims) with the net Medicare contribution, that is, Medicare reimbursement less beneficiaries' premiums. The data indicate that the net amount contributed by public Medicare funds was $1.41 billion or 30.8 percent compared to $3.16 billion or 69.2 percent paid by or on behalf of the beneficiaries (that is, paid by the beneficiary or for the beneficiary, for example, by Medicaid or other insurance).
Figure 2 provides a comparison of the data in Tables 15 and 16 . The bar on the left represents the channeling of payments for total physicians' charges that are due (from Table 15 ) and the bar on the right represents the sources of the funds for total physicians' charges that are due (from Table 16 ). The figure also suggests the complexity of the mechanism for the funding and for the payment of benefits for physicians' services under Medicare; the large proportion representing "Beneficiary Liability" is paid from several sources including out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, and by Medigap policies (the term given to insurance policies that fill in Medicare gaps in coverage.) 
Summary and Conclusions
This cross-sectional analysis shows that assignment rates vary considerably by geographic area and by specialty of the physician. In some areas of the nation, nearly all charges are assigned so that many of the beneficiaries are relieved of the burden of paying the physician any charges beyond those deemed "reasonable." Additionally, beneficiaries residing in areas where physicians generally accept assignment are relieved of the burden of the paper work involved in submitting claims-which can be difficult and confusing to an older and perhaps ill beneficiary. In contrast, in areas where the assignment rate is low, a vast majority of the beneficiaries have these burdens to contend with.
This analysis shows that of the total physicians' charges (excluding charges above the allowed on assigned claims), the payments channeled through Medicare amounted to 62 percent while payments made by or on behalf of the beneficiaries for the deductible, coinsurance, and for liability on unassigned claims amounted to nearly 38 percent of total physicians' charges. The percentage of payments for which the beneficiaries were liable was very high relative to Medicare's Part A program-where beneficiary liability was less than 10 percent of hospital charges in 1975.
A majority of Medicare beneficiaries carry private insurance to supplement Part B coverage. Of course, for this coverage, beneficiaries must pay additional premiums that generally are set high enough to cover benefits and administrative costs.
This analysis also shows that of the total physicians' charges (excluding charges above the allowed on assigned claims), the net amount contributed by Medicare was 30 percent (excluding prorated premium contributions). The remaining 70 percent of physicians' charges are attributed to liability for premium payments by or on behalf of the beneficiaries and for the deductible, coinsurance, and the amount exceeding the allowed charge on unassigned claims.
Because the percentage increase in Medicare Part B premiums is restricted to no more than the percentage increase in social security beneficiaries' checks, premium payments by or on behalf of beneficiaries-as a percent of total Medicare Part B receipts-has been declining while the general revenue portion of total Medicare receipts has been rising. In 1978 the percent from general revenues reached 69.4 percent while the percent from premium payments by beneficiaries fell to 24.1 percent (Gibson, 1978) . Thus, of the total Part B outlays, beneficiary contributions play a smaller role now than when Medicare began (approximately 50-50 contributions) and are likely to continue to decline. However, of the total physicians' charges that are liable for payment, the beneficiary portion may not simultaneously decline. First, the rate of reduction (that is, the difference between what the physicians charge 
69.2%
and what Medicare allows) has been increasing (approximately 11 percent reduction in 1971 compared to 19 percent in 1975) . Second, the assignment rate has generally been declining. Consequently, these forces may counteract the lower contribution of beneficiaries to Medicare outlays and may tend to keep up the amount of the total physicians' charges for which the beneficiaries are liable.
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Technical Note
Reliability of Estimates * The data used in this paper are estimates based on a 1 percent sample (except for Table 5 which is based on a 5 percent sample) of the beneficiary population and hence are subject to sampling variability. Tables A through I will enable the reader to obtain approximate standard errors for the estimates in this paper. The standard error is primarily a measure of sampling variability-that is, of the variation that occurs by chance because a sample rather than the whole population is used. To calculate the standard errors at a reasonable cost for the wide variety of estimates in this paper, it was necessary to use approximation methods. Thus, these tables should be used only as indicators of the order of magnitude of the standard errors for specific estimates.
The sample estimate and an estimate of its standard error permit us to construct interval estimates with prescribed confidence that the interval includes the average result of all possible samples (for a given sampling rate).
To illustrate, if all possible samples were selected, if each of these were surveyed under essentially the same conditions, and if an estimate and its estimated standard error were calculated from each sample, then:
i. Approximately 2 / 3 of the intervals from one standard error below the estimate to one standard error above the estimate would include the average value of all possible samples. We call an interval from one standard error below the estimate to one standard error above the estimate a 2 / 3 confidence interval.
ii. Approximately 9 / 10 of the intervals from 1.6 standard errors below the estimate to 1.6 standard errors above the estimate would include the average value of all possible samples. We call an interval from 1.6 standard errors below the estimate to 1.6 standard errors above the estimate a 90 percent confidence interval.
iii. Approximately 19 / 20 of the intervals from two standard errors below the estimate to two standard errors above the estimate would include the average value of all possible samples. We call an interval from two standard errors below the estimate to two standard errors above the estimate a 95 percent confidence interval. iv. Almost all intervals from three standard errors below the sample estimate to three standard errors above the sample estimate would include the average value of all possible samples. The average value of all possible samples may or may not be contained in any particular computed interval. But for a particular sample, one can say with specified confidence that the average of all possible samples is included in the constructed interval.
The relative standard error is defined as the standard error of the estimate divided by the value being estimated. In general, estimates for small subgroups, and percentages or means with small bases tend to be relatively unreliable. The reader should be aware that some of the estimates in this paper have high relative standard errors.
The use of Tables A and B is straightforward. For example, the standard error of an estimated $100 million reimbursement is found to be $3.5 million. Simple linear interpolation may be used for values not tabled.
Tables C through H are for estimated percentages or means per beneficiary and require knowledge of the number in the base of the estimate. Thee numbers can be found in Tables  J through O. To illustrate their use, Table 13 shows the amount of deductible per beneficiary for age group 65-69 to be $23.06. The following steps, using double linear interpolation, show how to obtain the standard error of this estimate.
* Prepared by James C. Beebe, Statistical and Research Services Branch, Office of Research.
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